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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explain how the choice between distributing cash through dividends or
shares repurchases affects the firm’s ability to raise capital in the financial market. I assume investors have
quadratic preferences over wealth but different prior beliefs about the likelihood a distribution takes place.
At date zero agents purchase shares given their expectation about the firm’s payout method. At date 1
the firm announces whether the payout takes place that period. As in Brennan and Thakor [3], investors
with different shareholdings have different incentives to gather information and, therefore, heterogeneous
preferences about payout methods at date 1. I assume the firm adopts the payout method preferred by the
majority of shareholders at date 1 under the one share/one vote rule. At date 2 the firm is liquidated and the
remaining output is distributed among its shareholders. If at date zero agents disagree but not too much on
the probability a distribution takes place, I show that a firm expected to pay dividends raises strictly more
financial capital than an otherwise identical firm which is expected to repurchase shares. Therefore, a larger
fraction of cash is distributed as dividend than through repurchases. One concludes that even in the presence
of a small tax disadvantage financial markets favor dividend paying firms.
Key words: Market Selection Hypothesis - Payout Policy - Production under Incomplete Markets
J.E.L. Classification Numbers: G35, D52, D84
1. INTRODUCTION
A corporation that wants to distribute cash to its shareholders may do so by way of a dividend payment
or a share repurchase. In their seminal paper, Miller and Modigliani [6] proved that in a world without taxes
or transaction costs, where all information is symmetrically distributed and there are complete markets and
contracts, shareholders would be indifferent between share repurchases and dividends. However, this prediction
is clearly counterfactual since firms rely heavily on dividends even when they offer a tax disadvantage over
repurchases. The choice of dividends as a method to distribute cash by corporations has been rationalized by
a number of authors (see [1] and references therein) as a costly signalling device that the manager of the firm
uses to convey her private information about the prospects of the firm to investors. These models, however, are
highly sensitive to the precise specification of the managerial objective function, and the difficulties to justify
an appropriate objective function, even when shareholders are symmetrically informed, are well known.1
In an illuminating paper, Brennan and Thakor [3] offer a theory of why shareholders have different
preferences for dividends and repurchases that does not rely upon an assumed asymmetry of information
between managers and investors. They assume that the share price is not a perfect aggregator of the private
information investors have about the prospects of the firm, and that the collection of information by shareholders
is costly. Under those circumstances, share repurchases are no longer a costless alternative to dividends if some
of the shareholders are better informed than others about the prospects of the firm. Hence, share repurchases
generate a redistribution of wealth from the uninformed to the informed. When money is paid out in the form
of dividends, instead, there is no adverse selection because the informed and uninformed investors receive a pro
rata amount. As a result, they argue, uninformed shareholders prefer dividends to repurchases. According to this
theory, the manner in which the cash distribution is made creates different incentives to collect information by
the shareholders. If there is a fixed cost of acquiring information, large shareholders will have a greater incentive
to become informed than will small shareholders. Therefore, repurchases are associated with redistribution of
wealth from small to large shareholders.
To explain the choice of payout method by the firm, Brennan and Thakor assume that the manager takes the
decision preferred by the owners of the majority of shares. Under this hypothesis, they show that dividends are
likely to be observed for small cash distributions while for large cash distributions share repurchases are more
likely. The precise outcome depends on the size distribution of shares, which they take as exogenous.
Brennan and Thakor’s theory rationalizes why firms use different payout methods. To argue that it explains
why a large fraction of cash disbursements takes the form of dividends, however, one must be ready to accept
that most distributions tend to be small. This paper explores an alternative explanation for this phenomena. It
might well be the case that dividend paying firms simply raise more capital than otherwise identical firms that
1 A common feature of these models is the dependence of the utility of managers on both the current stock price as well as the end of
period distribution of cash ows from the firm.
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repurchase shares. If this were the case, then the fraction of cash distributed through dividends would exceed,
ceteris paribus, the fraction of cash distributed by means of share repurchases. That is, capital markets favor
those firms that pay dividends.
The purpose of this paper is to explain how the choice of the payout method affects the firm’s ability to raise
funds in the capital market. The theory proposed by Brennan and Thakor begs the question on how markets
selects among firms which adopt different payout methods, a question that could not be addressed in the Miller
and Modigliani framework where the payout method is irrelevant. Brennan and Thakor, however, did not focus
on this issue because they take both the distribution of shares as well as the firm’s financial capital as given.
To address this issue, the size distribution of shares must be endogenous because it is the equilibrium price of
shares what determines the funds an equity financed firm can raise in the stock market. In my model, as in
Brennan and Thakor’s model, agents with different portfolios have different incentives to gather information.
Investors who anticipate they will remain uninformed in the event a payout takes place, demand a higher risk
premium to hold shares if the company is expected to repurchase its stock rather than paying dividends; the
opposite is true for those who anticipate they will obtain informational rents in an open market repurchase. The
main question I ask is whether the choice of one payout method over another allows an equity financed firm to
raise more funds in the capital market.
Even though for a given size distribution of shares and cash payment there is a unique payout method
preferred by the majority of shareholders, I argue that ex-ante identical firms can actually have different size
distribution of shares and, therefore, choose different methods to distribute cash. This is because the size
distribution of shares depends on the expectation that investors hold at the moment they buy shares about what
the preferred form of cash distribution will be when the distribution takes place. If investors conjecture that the
firm will repurchase shares then those who anticipate they will obtain information buy more shares and those
who expect to remain uninformed buy less shares than if the firm were to pay dividends, changing the identity
and preferences of the median voter in the shareholders’ assembly.
I develop my results in a general equilibrium model of a stock market with two firms that at date zero issue
equity shares to finance a project. Investors, who have quadratic preferences and maximize expected utility
of wealth, disagree only about the probability the project will yield some output at date 1 and this creates the
heterogeneity in their shareholdings. At date 1, after learning whether the technology yields some output in that
period, each shareholder can pay a fixed cost in order to learn what the output will be at date 2. At date 2, the
firm is liquidated and each shareholder receives a fraction of the proceedings proportional to her shares. If the
project generates some output at date 1, investors agree that the firm should distribute the proceedings among
its shareholders because they all have access to a better investment opportunity than the firm has. The form to
distribute cash is chosen by the manager who follows the method preferred by the owners of the majority of
shares under the one share/one vote rule.
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If the firm decides to repurchase shares, it has to announce it publicly and has to place an order with a dealer.2
The open market repurchase takes place between dates 1 and 2. My model of the open market repurchase is an
adaptation to a finite number of rounds of Brennan and Thakor’s model.3 The market maker is risk neutral; she
does not take a net position and simply crosses orders at the announced price. Once the repurchase program
is announced, investors follow their optimal information gathering strategy. The initial price depends only
on the available public information. After all feasible trades have been made at the current market price, the
market closes and the market maker quotes a new price which reects the expected value of the shares given
the information in the previous order ow. I show that, informed investors tender their shares if and only if the
quoted price exceeds the true value of the firm while uniformed never tender. Therefore, after two rounds the
behavior of the informed shareholders fully reveals the true value of the assets to the market maker.
I show that there exist equilibria where ex-ante identical firms choose different payout methods. The main
result of this paper is that if agents disagree but not too much about the probability a distribution takes place,
a dividend paying firm raises strictly more funds in the capital market (and produce more) than an otherwise
identical firm which conducts open market repurchases.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Each would-be uninformed shareholder of a firm that
repurchases shares anticipates that with positive probability she will lose wealth at the hand of the informed
shareholders. Therefore, the stock of that firm has a lower expected value for the would-be uninformed
shareholders than the stock of an otherwise identical firm which pays dividends. However, the opposite is true
for the would-be informed shareholders. Hence, the total effect on the demand for shares of the firm and the
shares price is not obvious. Since shares of the dividend paying firm do not suffer from adverse selection, I
show that the aggregate demand for shares of both firms coincides with the demand of a representative agent.
This agent holds all the stock of the dividend paying and the repurchasing firms but she believes the marginal
variance of the firm which repurchase shares is greater than that of the dividend paying firm while the expected
rate of return of the former is smaller than the mean of the latter. The risk premium of the firm that repurchases
shares, therefore, must be higher. Thus, ceteris paribus, the shares of a firm expected to conduct an open market
repurchase must sell at a lower price than those of a firm expected to pay dividends, which implies the dividend
paying firm raises more capital. An additional insight of this paper is that a manager who wants to maximize
the firm’s market share should pay dividends instead of repurchasing shares.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is based on the theory proposed by Brennan and Thakor [3] to explain why shareholders are not
2 In the US this is regulated by Rule 10b-18 which requires that firms repurchasing shares on the open market should publicly
announce the repurchase program, only use one dealer on any single day, avoid trading on an up tick or during the last half-hour before
the closing of the market, and limit the daily volume of purchases to a specified amount.
3 The adaptation is needed because in their model the value of the assets has a uniform distribution while I assume that the return on
shares can only take two values.
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indifferent between dividends and open market repurchases. Barclay and Smith [2] also argue those firms that
repurchase shares face a higher cost of capital. They suggest that open market repurchases in which managers
participate give them an opportunity to expropriate uninformed shareholders. When an open market repurchase
is announced, they argue, the specialist recognizes that more informed traders (the corporation’s managers)
enter the market. Therefore, he widens the bid-ask spread until he earns again a competitive rate of return
which causes the price at which he buys shares to fall. Anticipating this, the investors raise the required rate of
return for the shares of firms that are expected to repurchase shares. This implies that the price of the shares of
a firm which conduct open market repurchases is lower than the price of an otherwise identical firm which pays
dividends. In this respect, their conclusions about the effect of the payout method on the price of shares are the
same I obtain. However, their result is based on the assumption there is an agency problem while in this paper
I do not make that assumption. In addition, since Barclay and Smith do not model the firm’s decisions, they
cannot address how the investor’s expectation about the payout method affects the ability of the firm to raise
funds in the capital market neither they show that ex-ante identical firms can actually choose different payout
methods as I do.
In its focus on the preferences of the majority as a way to solve the conict of interests associated to the
decision problem of the firm in incomplete markets, this paper is close to those by De Marzo [5] and Crès [4].
However, those papers focus only on the effect of the institution of majority voting on the choice of the firm’s
production plan while I make assumptions so that such conict does not exists and study the consequences of
the choice of different payout methods.
1.2 Overview
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I present the main features of the model and explain
how information unfolds over time. In section 3, I analyze the equilibrium of an economy where firms pay
dividends and provide conditions such that a unique equilibrium exists. Section 4 describes a version of
Brennan and Thakor’s model of an open market repurchase. I take both the cash distribution as well as the size
distribution of shares as given and solve for the equilibrium strategies of informed and uninformed investors. I
also discuss the incentives to gather information of shareholders and derive the preferences over dividends and
open market repurchases of investors with different shareholdings. In section 5, I introduce the concept of a
Majority Equilibrium in which managers are restricted to choose the payout policy preferred by the majority
of shareholders. This section contains the main result of the paper: If agents disagree but not too much on the
probability a distribution takes place, a dividend paying firm raises more capital and has a larger market share
than an otherwise identical firm which repurchases shares. Section 6 concludes the paper. All other proofs are
gathered in the Appendix.
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2. THE MODEL
In this section I describe the main features of the model. First I discuss the firm’s investment opportunities
and how information about the return of assets and the yield of the technology unfolds over time. Then, I
describe investors’ preferences and beliefs. Finally, I characterize the individual’s demand function for shares.
2.1 Firms
Consider an economy where there is one consumption good produced by two ex-ante identical firms.4 Time
is indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The state space of the economy is S ≡ {1, 2, ..., S} and F is the partition which
consists of all the subsets of S. The function P : F 7→ [0, 1] is a probability measure and the triple (S,F , P ) is
the probability space of this economy.
The technology firm i ∈ {1, 2} uses to produce its output can be described by two independent random
variables, d : S 7→ {1, 2} and θi : S 7→ {θL, θH}
d (s) =
½
1 with prob. bε
2 with prob. 1− bε θi (s) =
½
θL with prob. π
θH with prob. 1− π
where 0 ≤ θL < θH . It follows that θi has mean θ ≡ (1− π) · (θH − θL) + θL > 0 and variance
σ2 ≡ π · (1− π) · (θH − θL)2. In addition, I assume θ1 and θ2 are independent. Let yi,t denote the output of
firm i at date t. Then, yi : S × <+ 7→ <2+, with typical element (yi,1, yi,2), is the output stream of firm i. If
firm i invests yi,0 ≥ 0 at date zero, the technology yields
yi (s) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(c, θi) · yαi,0 if d (s) = 1
(0, θi + c) · yαi,0 if d (s) = 2
where α ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, c · yαi,0 can be interpreted as a cash ow that can arrive either at date 1 or 2 and
d (s) is the cash ow random arrival date which is common to all firms.
At date zero, each firm issues equity to finance production. The realization of d is revealed to every agent at
date 1. Therefore, the knowledge of the agents at date 1 is represented by FU , the partition generated by d. The
realization of θ1 and θ2, instead, becomes public information only at the beginning of period 2. Nonetheless, it
can be privately learned by any investor at date 1 at a physical cost of f > 0. The knowledge of an investor who
acquires information at date 1 can be represented by the partition FI ≡ F . Finally, at date 2, after the value
of θi becomes public information, the firm is liquidated and output is distributed proportionally to the shares
owned by each shareholder at that moment. The only function the firm manager is to decide how to distribute
the firm’s earnings at date 1 in the event the output is positive on that period.
4 Actually, I like to think that there are two groups of firms and these two firms represent the average behavior of all other firms in the
group. Most of the result in this paper apply to both interpretations. The interpretation of firms as representing the average behavior of
a group is only needed in section 5.2.
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2.2 Financial Markets
There are markets for shares and bonds which open at date zero and achieve a perfectly competitive
equilibrium.5 To simplify the analysis, I do not allow agents to sell shares short.6 Let pi ∈ <+ and ri : S 7→ <+
denote the price and the stochastic gross rate of return of firm i’s shares. Let q be the price of a bond which
yields 1 unit of the consumption good at date 2.
2.3 Investors
Investors are born at date zero endowed with wealth w0. They know π but they disagree on the value of bε. I
assume that there exists two types of investors, a fraction g (ε) = λ ∈ (0, 1) of them believe bε equals ε ∈ (0, 1)
while the fraction g (ε) = 1 − λ believe bε equals ε ∈ (ε, 1). Let A ≡ {ε, ε} denote the set of investors in
this economy. The knowledge of the investors at date zero is represented by F0, the trivial partition. Let Pε be
investor ε’s date zero beliefs about the states of nature.
Investors consume only at date 2, do not discount future consumption and have preferences over wealth that
can be represented by a quadratic utility function
u (z) = z − δ
2
· z2 ; z ≥ 0
If investor ε’s wealth is represented by the random variable w : S 7→<+, the expected utility of wealth of
investor ε with information partition F 0 is7
Eε
£
u (w)
°°F 0 ¤ = Eε £w °°F 0 ¤− δ2 ·Eε £w2 °°F 0 ¤
Then, the marginal utility of wealth is positive in every state s if and only if
w (s) <
1
δ
∀s ∈ S (1)
Let w0, w (s) denote the aggregate wealth at date 0 and in state s at date 2, respectively. Since only w0 is
available for investment at date zero, then the most that can be consumed at date 2 is 2 · (θH + c) ·
¡w0
2
¢α. In
addition, the wealth of each individual at date 2 cannot exceed 2min{λ,1−λ} · (θH + c) ·
¡w0
2
¢α because individual
wealth is non-negative. The following assumption, therefore, ensures that for each individual the marginal
utility of wealth is positive in every state of nature.
Assumption NS: 2min{λ,1−λ} · (θH + c) ·
¡w0
2
¢α
<
1
δ
.
Let xi ∈ <+ be the shares of firm i the investor purchases at date zero and let x ≡ (x1, x2), p ≡ (p1, p2),
5 At date zero, there are no information asymmetries so it seems reasonable to assume that trading would yield a competitive equilib-
rium outcome.
6 The assumption that investors cannot sell shares short simplifies the analysis because it keeps the relationship one share/one vote.
7 For any random variable ξ : S 7→ <+, Eε (ξ |F 0 ) and varε (ξ |F 0 ) denotes investor ε’s perception of its mean and variance,
respectively, given information F 0. Eε (ξ |F0 ) and varε (ξ |F0 ) are denoted Eε (ξ) and varε (ξ), respectively.
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and r ≡ (r1, r2) be her portfolio, the prices of shares and the rates of return of the shares, respectively. Then,
the investor’s wealth in state s is
w (r1, r2, p, q, x) (s) ≡
³
r1 (s)− p1q
´
· x1 +
³
r2 (s)− p2q
´
· x2 + w0q
The preferences of investors over random wealth naturally induce preferences over portfolios. Investor ε’s
utility of holding portfolio (x1, x2) at date zero is:
Eε [u (w (r1, r2, p, q, x)) kF0 ] = Eε [w (·, x) kF0 ]
¡
1− δ2Eε [w (·, x) kF0 ]
¢
− δ2 · varε [w (·, x) kF0 ]
which depends only on the mean and the variance of the investor’s wealth.
In order to explain the portfolio choice of the investor, I define the set of no arbitrage prices. In this paper,
the following conditions are always met:
· ∃ an agent ε ∈ A such that Pε [(θL + c) · pαi ≤ ri (s) ≤ (θH + c) · pαi , ∀i = 1, 2] = 1 (2)
· For every agent ε ∈ A, Pε [ri (s) = (θL + c) · pαi , ∀i = 1, 2] > 0 (3)
If the agent who meets condition (2) is not satiated, the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that
θL + c <
p1−αi
q
< θH + c i = 1, 2 (4)
Define the set
Ψ =
©
(p1, p2, q) ∈ <3+ : p1 + p2 = w0 and (4) holds
ª
.
Let (p, q) ∈ Ψ. Investor ε’s decision problem is
maxEε [u (w (r1, r2, p, q, x)) kF0 ]
s.t. w (r1, r2, p.q, x) (s) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S
Let x (r, p, q, ε) ∈ <2+ be the solution to this problem.
3. DIVIDEND EQUILIBRIUM
In this section I assume that if a firm needs to distribute cash at date 1, then it does it in the form of a
dividend. Therefore, shareholders have no inuence on the choice of the payout method. First, I describe the
rate of return of the firm’s shares and find the aggregate demand for shares. I define a dividend equilibrium and
provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium.
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Total output of firm i depends on the capital it raises at date zero. Since the firm is equity financed, then its
financial capital at date zero is pi and its output stream is
yi,t =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(c, θL) · pαi with prob. bε · π
(c, θH) · pαi with prob. bε · (1− π)
(0, θL + c) · pαi with prob. (1− bε) · π
(0, θH + c) · pαi with prob. (1− bε) · (1− π)
At date 1, investors have access to an investment opportunity which is not available to the firms. For
simplicity, I suppose that investors have a storage technology that transfers one unit of the consumption good
from one period to the next.8 If the project yields positive output at date 1, therefore, all shareholders agree on
the need to distribute it. Hence, firm i’s rate of return per share is rDi ≡ (θi + c) ·pαi andEε
¡
rDi
¢
=
¡
θ + c
¢ ·pαi
is the same for every investor ε ∈ A.
The aggregate demand for shares and bonds is
XDi
¡
rD, p, q
¢
≡ λ · xi
¡
rD, p, q, ε
¢
+ (1− λ) · xi
¡
rD, p, q, ε
¢
= xi
¡
rD, p, q, ε
¢
B (p, q) ≡ w0−p1·X
D
1 (rD,p,q)−p2·XD2 (rD,p,q)
q
Definition 3.1 A Dividend Equilibrium (DE) is a (p1, p2, q) ∈ <3+ such that XDi
¡
rD, p, q
¢
= 1 for i = 1, 2
and B (p, q) = 0.
In a DE investors take asset prices as given, no short-selling is allowed, firms distribute cash by means
of dividends and markets clear. Since agents consume only at date 2, they fully invest their wealth at date 0.
Because bonds are in zero net supply, the market value of the firms equals the initial wealth. Moreover, since
firms are ex-ante identical and follow the same payout policy, their shares sell at the same price.
Proposition 3.1 If aDE exists, p1 = p2 = w02 .
After some algebra, one can show that the market for bonds clears if and only if q equals
q∗ ≡
¡w0
2
¢1−α · 1δw0 (w02 )1−α−(θ+c)
(θ+c)
k
1
δw0
(w02 )
1−α−(θ+c)
l
−σ2/2
(5)
which implies that there can be at most one DE. It follows that a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of aDE is that the left hand side of (5) is positive, which is always true under assumption NS.
Proposition 3.2 If assumption NS holds,
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
∗¢ is the uniqueDE. Moreover, ¡w02 , w02 , q∗¢ ∈ Ψ.
In the unique DE the investors’ marginal rates of substitution between mean and variance of wealth are
equalized. Moreover, since every investor buys the same portfolio, has the same preferences and is endowed
with the same initial wealth, one concludes that in a DE markets are effectively complete.
8 What is really needed is some reason so that investors unanimously prefer the firm to distribute its earnings at date 1.
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4. A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS PAYOUT METHODS
In this section I take the cash payment and the size distribution of shares as given and consider the problem of
a firm that must choose to distribute cash either by means of an open market repurchase (OMR) or dividends.
First I describe the process of an open market repurchase. Then, I show that under some weak assumptions,
uninformed shareholders never tender and the informed ones tender all shares if and only if the price is above
the true value of the firm. I analyze the incentives of shareholders to acquire information and derive their
preferences between OMR and dividend payments before they collect information. Finally I obtain the date
zero demand for shares.
4.1 The model of an open market repurchase
Let (p1, p2, q) ∈ Ψ be the price of assets at date zero. Let S1 ≡ {s : d (s) = 1} denote the event in which
a cash distribution takes place at date 1. Let J 6= ∅ be the set of firms which choose to repurchase shares.
On S1, company i ∈ J has some cash, c · pαi , it will distribute by means of an open market repurchase;
furthermore those agents who decided to become informed about (θ1, θ2) have already gathered information
and sunk the cost f . Let ωi ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of shares in hand of firm i’s uninformed investors and
let ω ≡ (ω1, ω2).
Since open market repurchase programs often extend over several months, it may be difficult for investors
to determine whether repurchases are actually taking place on any given day. Following Brennan and Thakor,
in order to reect in a simple manner the assumption that the share price is not fully revealing of the private
information held by the informed investors, I assume that between dates 1 and 2 the market maker opens twice.
At each round of transactions, n ∈ {1, 2}, the market maker announces a price ρni . Therefore, in round n the
fraction βni of its outstanding shares that the firm wants to repurchase satisfies βni · ρni = c · pαi . Investors place
orders with the market maker to trade at the announced price.9 The repurchase program ends as soon as the
offer is fully subscribed. The market maker is risk neutral; she does not take a net position and simply crosses
orders at the announced price. If there is an order imbalance, the market maker randomly rations the long side
of the market. The initial price depends only on the public information available. Therefore, the first price
announced by the market maker is ρ1i = E [ri kS1 ] =
¡
θ + c
¢ · pαi . After all feasible trades have been made
at the current market price, the market closes and the market maker then quotes a new price which reects the
expected value of the shares given the information in the previous order ow.
The payoff each investor obtains when an open market repurchase is conducted depends not only on her
decision about tendering or not her shares in a given round but also on the decision taken by every other investor
in that round. This is because the extent to which her market order will be fulfilled depends on whether the sum
9 As in Brennan and Thakor’s model, if the cash distribution is not too large with respect to the liquidation value of the firm, then the
informed shareholders have enough shares to fully subscribe the offer.
9
of all orders exceeds or not the offer βni . For example, if every investor tenders her shares in a given round,
then the market maker rations the supply side and purchases only a fraction βni of the shares tendered by each
investor. Likewise, if 1− ωi > βni and every informed shareholders tender their shares, the market maker only
buys a fraction β
n
i
1−ωi of each order at the quoted price. Therefore, there is strategic interaction and the optimal
decision for each investor depends on her conjectures about the decision of the remaining shareholders.
4.2 Timeline of events
In this model, a cash distribution is needed at date 1 with probability bε, independently of the mode of payout
the firm chooses. In figure 1, I describe the time of events for a firm that distributes cash through an OMR.
ii
i
i i
i
i
c
c
i
ε
ε
α
α
α
^
^
Figure 1. Timeline for a firm that repurchases shares.
At date zero, investors buy shares of the firm without knowing whether a distribution will take place at date
1 or not. On the event that no distribution takes place at date 1, at date 2, after θi is publicly revealed, the firm is
liquidated and each shareholder is paid (θi + c) ·pαi per share. These events are represented in the upper branch
of the tree of events described in Figure 1. In the lower branch of that tree, which occurs with probability bε, the
project yields output c · pαi at date 1. The firm announces the OMR and submits an order to the market maker
to buy c·p
α
i
ρ1i
shares at the current price ρ1i . The first round takes place. If the offer is fully subscribed, then no
second round takes place. Otherwise, the second round does take place. At date 2, after θi is revealed, the firm
is liquidated and each shareholder who did not tender her shares receives θi·p
α
i
1−βn∗i
per share, where n∗ denotes
the round in which the offer was subscribed.
The timeline for a dividend paying firm only differs from that in Figure 1 in the lower branch, when the firm
needs to distribute cash, because each shareholder receives c · pαi per share at date 1.
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4.3 Rates of Return
In this section, I obtain the return of the shares belonging to firms that employ different payout methods.
Since agents have different information, they perceived the rate of return of a given firm’s shares differently and
so I consider the rate of return for both the informed as well as the uninformed ones.
Suppose the distribution of shares is exogenously given and assume that 1 − ωi > cθ .
10 In each round of
the OMR, the uninformed investor can choose the fraction of her shares she wants to tender. Since her actions
cannot be contingent on the informed investors’ actions, the uninformed investor strategy depends only on the
round of the open market repurchase and the price quoted by the market maker in that round. Consider the
following strategies for the informed and the uninformed shareholders:
bγI : Tender all shares of firm i ∈ J if and only if the quoted price is greater or equal to the true value of the
firm. Do not tender any share otherwise.
bγU : Do not tender any share of firm i ∈ J .
If bγU and bγI are the strategies of the uninformed and the informed, then
1. On {s : θi (s) = θL} ∩ S1, the repurchase ends in the first round and the repurchase price is
¡
θ + c
¢ · pαi .
2. On {s : θi (s) = θH}∩S1, the repurchase ends in the second round and the repurchase price is (θH + c) ·pαi .
3. The rate of return per share of firm i for an informed shareholder who follows strategy bγI is
rIi (ωi) (s) ≡
£
θi (s) + c
I
i (ωi) (s)
¤·pαi where cIi (ωi) (s) ≡
(
c ·
³
1 + ωi1−ωi · τ
´
if (θi (s) , d (s)) = (θL, 1)
c otherwise
where τ ≡
³
1− θL
θ
´
is the implicit tax rate per share the uninformed shareholder faces in an OMR if she does
not tender her shares. It follows that Eε
¡
rIi
¢
=
¡
θ + c
¢
+ π · ε · τ · c · ωi1−ωi and varε
¡
rIi
¢
decreases with ωi.
4. The rate of return per share of firm i for an uninformed shareholder who follows strategy bγU is
rUi (s) ≡
£
θi (s) + c
U
i (s)
¤ · pαi where cUi (s) ≡ ½ c · (1− τ) if (θi (s) , d (s)) = (θL, 1)c otherwise
and, therefore, her expected rate of return conditional on S1 is Eε
¡
rUi kS1
¢
(s) =
£
θ + c− π · τ · c¤ · pαi .
Lemma 4.1 Let (p, q) ∈ Ψ. If every uninformed investor follows bγU and every informed investor follows bγI ,
there is δ (p, q) such that for all 0 < δ < δ (p, q) no investor wants to deviate unilaterally from
³bγI , bγU´.
In what follows, therefore, for each k ∈ {I, U} the vector of rates of return is
rkJ (ω) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
¡
rk1 , r
k
2
¢
if J = {1, 2}¡
rki , r
D
−i
¢
if J = {i}¡
rD1 , r
D
2
¢
if J = ∅
10 Below I provide sufficient conditions so that this inequality is implied by market clearing at date zero.
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4.4 Endogenous Information Acquisition
To this point, I have taken as exogenous the relative proportions of informed and uninformed investors in
the shareholders assembly. Now, I consider which shareholders choose to pay the fixed cost f > 0 of observing
(θ1, θ2) after the firms announce a repurchase. I characterize the information decision of each investor as a
function of her shareholdings.
Consider an investor who holds portfolio x ∈ <2+ and believes ω ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] is the fraction of shares in
hands of the uninformed shareholders when the announced payout policy is J ∈ P ≡ {{1} , {2} , {1, 2}}. The
value of information for that investor, conditional on the event a repurchase is announced by firms in J , is
∆J (ω, p, q, x) ≡ Eπ
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ (ω) , p, q, x
¢¤ |S1 ¢−Eπ ¡u £w ¡rUJ , p, q, x¢¤ |S1 ¢
and he chooses to acquire information if and only if∆J (ω, p, q, x) > f .
As one could expect, the value of information increases with the fraction of shares in hand of the uninformed
and with the number of firms which announce a share repurchase.
Lemma 4.2 Suppose δ < δ (p, q) and J 0 ∈ P . The function∆J 0 (ω, p, q, x) has the following properties:
i. It is an increasing function of ωi for every i ∈ J 0.
ii. J ⊂ J 0 ⇒ ∆J (ω, p, q, x) ≤ ∆J 0 (ω, p, q, x) for all ω ∈ [0, 1).
For fixed distribution of shares [x (ε) , x (ε)], the fraction owned by investors who remain uninformed when
firms in J ∈ P repurchase shares, ωJ , is implicitly defined by the following system of equations
ωJ =
X
ε:∆J (ωJ ,p,q,x(ε))≤f
g (ε) · x (ε)
Let Ω ≡ {ωJ }J∈P be the collection of expectations about the fraction of shares owned by the uninformed.
4.5 Preferences for Dividends and OMR
Shareholders express their preferences over payout methods before the information about (θ1, θ2) is
collected. To determine each shareholder’s preferred mode of cash distribution, therefore, it is necessary to
calculate, for each investor, the unconditional expected utility under dividends and open market repurchases.
For J ∈ P ∪∅, define,
VJ (ω, p, q, x) ≡ max
©
Eπ
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ (ω) , p, q, x
¢¤ kS1 ¢− f,Eπ ¡u £w ¡rUJ , p, q, x¢¤ kS1 ¢ª
Clearly, VJ (ω, p, q, x) is the expected utility of an investor who holds portfolio x and optimally decides
whether to acquire information or not, under the expectation that ω will be the fraction of shares in hands of the
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uninformed shareholders. Let
∆VJ 0J (Ω, p, q, x) ≡ VJ 0 [ωJ 0 , p, q, x]− VJ [ωJ , p, q, x]
be investor ε’s expected utility gain if the firms’ payout policy changes from J to J 0 ∈ P ∪∅. If investor ε
holds portfolio x, then she prefers J over J 0, conditional on S1, if and only if∆VJ 0J (Ω, p, q, x) < 0.
If the underlying size distribution of shares is [x (ε) , x (ε)], one says that the majority of shareholders of
firm i prefers J over J 0 if and only if X
ε:∆VJ0J (Ω,p,q,x(ε))<0
g (ε) · xi (ε) > 1
2
Suppose the majority of shareholders of firm i prefers J over J 0. If i ∈ J and J 0 = J\ {i}, then the majority
prefers firm i to repurchase shares. Likewise, if i /∈ J and J 0 = J ∪ {i}, the majority prefers firm i to pay
dividends. Therefore, given prices (p, q) ∈ Ψ, δ < δ (p, q) and a fixed set J ∈ P ∪∅, there exists a unique
payout method which is preferred by the majority of shareholders of each firm.
4.6 The Distribution of Shares
At date zero, investors decide their shareholdings under the expectation that firm i ∈ J would repurchase
shares in the event a repurchase takes place and firm j /∈ J pays dividends.
Suppose investor ε expects at date zero that firms in J ∈ P will repurchase shares and that ω will be the
fraction of shares of each firm owned by the would-be uninformed investors. Define
xIJ (ω, p, q, ε) ≡ argmax
x∈<2+
Eε
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ , p, q, x
¢¤¢
s.t. w
¡
rIJ , p, q, x
¢
(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S
xUJ (p, q, ε) ≡ argmax
x∈<2+
Eε
¡
u
£
w
¡
rUJ , p, q, x
¢¤¢
s.t. w
¡
rUJ , p, q, x
¢
(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S
xIJ (ω, p, q, ε) and xUJ (p, q, ε) are the portfolios chosen by an investor who at date zero anticipates that in
the event a repurchase takes place at date 1 she will acquire information and remain uninformed, respectively.11
Since investor ε maximizes expected utility, then her optimal portfolio at date zero is
xJ (ω, p, q, ε) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
xIJ (ω, p, q, ε) if Eε
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ , p, q, x
I
J
¢¤¢
− ε · f > Eε
¡
u
£
w
¡
rUJ , p, q, x
U
J
¢¤¢
xUJ (p, q, ε) otherwise
The reader may conjecture that whenever ε anticipates that she will become informed in the event a
repurchase takes place, ε also does it. This is not always true, however, because the date zero expected cost of
information increases with ε.12
11 As in Brennan and Thakor, I implicitly assume that agents do not alter their date 0 shareholdings unless a stock repurchase causes
them to.
12 This conjecture would be correct, for example, if E(u[w(r
I
J ,p,q,x
I
J )]kS1 )−E(u[w(rUJ ,p,q,xUJ )]kS1 )
ε were increasing in ε.
13
5. MAJORITY EQUILIBRIUM
In this section I address how the investors’ date zero expectation about the firm’s payout method affects
the ability of the company to raise capital in the stock market. This point is not addressed by Brennan and
Thakor because they assume the size distribution of shares is exogenous and, therefore, they did not solve for
the equilibrium in the capital market.
Since firms are equity financed, the capital each firm is able to raise depends only on the market value of the
firm, i.e. the price of its shares at date zero. The market value of the firm, however, depends on the investors’
expectation about the payout method that would be preferred by the majority of shareholders. In equilibrium the
asset market clears, firms use the method of cash disbursement most preferred by the majority of shareholders,
investors demand shares in order to maximize their expected utility given their expectation about the choice of
payout method and expectations are correct.
Fix a distribution of shares [x (ε) , x (ε)]. The demand for firm i’s shares and bonds are
Xi ≡ λ · xi (ε) + (1− λ) · xi (ε) for i = 1, 2
B ≡ w0−p1·X1−p2·X2q
Definition 5.1 A Majority Equilibrium (ME) is a collection {J ,Ω, x, (p1, p2, q)} consisting of a set
J ∈ P ∪∅ of distribution policies, a distribution of shares [x (ε) , x (ε)] ∈ <4+, expectations Ω and prices
(p1, p2, q) ∈ Ψ such that
¥ INFORMED AND UNINFORMED FOLLOW
³bγU , bγI´ IN AN OMR
E.1. δ (p, q) > δ and 1− ωh,J 0J > cθ , ∀h ∈ {1, 2} and J 0 ∈ P.
¥ PORTFOLIO IS OPTIMAL GIVEN EXPECTATIONS
E.2 x (ε) = xJ (ωJ , p, q, ε) for every ε ∈ [ε, ε]
¥MARKETS CLEAR
E.3. Xi = 1,∀i = 1, 2.
E.4. B = 0.
¥ EXPECTATIONS ARE CORRECT
E.5. ωJ 0 =
P
ε:∆J0(ωJ0 ,p,q,x(ε))≤f
g (ε) · x (ε) ∀J 0 ∈ P.
¥ THE PAYOUT POLICY IS PREFERRED BY THE SHAREHOLDER’S MAJORITY
E.6. ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, P
ε:∆VJ0J (Ω,p,q,x(ε))<0
g (ε) · xi (ε) > 12 for J 0 =
½ J \{i} if i ∈ J
J∪ {i} if i /∈ J .
Condition E.1 says that in a Majority Equilibrium uninformed and informed shareholders would optimally
follow strategies bγU and bγI , respectively, in the event some firm repurchases shares. E.2 states that the portfolio
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of each agent maximizes her expected utility given her expectation about the distribution policies and the
fraction of shares in hand of the uninformed shareholders of each firm. E.3 and E.4 are the market clearing
conditions, while E.5 says that investors at date zero have correct expectations about the fraction of shares that
would be in hand of the uninformed in the event a firm decides to repurchase at date 1. Finally, E.6 requires
that each firm’s payout policy is prefered by the majority of its shareholders at date 1.
The assumption that conjectures are correct does not rule out the possibility that ex-ante identical firms
choose different payout methods in equilibrium.13 Therefore, this model is appropriate to address how, ceteris
paribus, the choice of payout method affects the firm’s ability to raise capital in the financial market.
In a Majority Equilibrium firms are partitioned in two sets. Firms in set J choose to conduct an open market
repurchase in the event they need to distribute cash. Firms which are not in J , choose to pay dividends in the
event a payout is needed. If the set J is empty, then all firms use dividends while if J = {1, 2} every firm
distributes cash by mean of shares repurchases. If J /∈ {∅, {1, 2}}, then ex-ante identical firms choose different
payout methods. Since firms are ex-ante identical, it seems reasonable to define a symmetric ME as one in
which every firm chooses the same payout policy.
Definition 5.2 AME {J ,Ω, x, (p1, p2, q)} is symmetric if J = ∅ or J = {1, 2}.
Now, I begin the analysis of the ME. The first proposition shows that under assumption NS no agent
can be satiated in a ME because market clearing implies that individual wealth must be bounded above by
2
min{λ,1−λ} · (θH + c) ·
¡w0
2
¢α.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose {J ,Ω, x, (p1, p2, q)} is a ME. If NS holds and ωi,J < 1 for some firm i = 1, 2,
condition (1) holds in every state s ∈ S and for every agent ε ∈ A.
The following Proposition argues that share prices must add up to total initial wealth and that in any
symmetric equilibria the value of the firms must be identical. It is important to notice, however, that it leaves
open the possibility that firms that choose different payout policies have different market value.
Proposition 5.2 If aME exists, p1 + p2 = w0. If theME is symmetric, then p1 = p2 = w02 .
5.1 Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium every firm raises the same amount of financial capital at date zero. This is
because investors do not consume at date zero and, therefore, they fully invest their wealth independently of the
firms’ payout policy. However, the equilibrium price of bonds does depend on the payout policy of the firms.
From the definition of aME, it is straightforward to show that if {J ,Ω, x, (p1, p2, q)} is aME in which every
firm pays dividends, then (p1, p2, q) is also a DE and, therefore q = q∗. Since every symmetricME in which
13 I like to think about the case in which ex-ante identical firms choose different payout methods, as a way of modelling that managers
may have different objectives. One may think that all managers find it worthwhile to do what the majority of shareholders prefer (perhaps
to avoid being fired) but given that, some may prefer to pay dividends and others may prefer to conduct open market repurchases.
Announcing their preferred payout method, managers can coordinate investors’ expectations.
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firms pay dividends induces a DE, a natural question is when a DE fails to be associated with a ME. To
answer this question first notice that in aME in which both firms pay dividends, every investor buys one share
of each firm. Then, in the event an open market repurchase takes place, they all want to be on the same side
of the market: either all of them want to acquire information or to remain uninformed. Since informational
rents become infinitely large as everybody remains uninformed, it cannot be the case that everybody stays
uninformed. It follows that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of aME in which every
firm pays dividends are E.1 and
∆{i}
¡
0, w02 ,
w0
2 , q
∗, 1
¢
> f for some i = 1, 2 (6)
where 0 ≡ (0, 0). Condition (6) requires that every shareholder would acquire information in the case an open
market repurchase takes place.
Proposition 5.3 Suppose NS holds. AME with J = ∅ exists iff δ ¡w02 , w02 , q∗¢ > δ and (6) holds.
Proposition 5.3, completely characterizes a ME where every firm pays dividends. Consider now the case in
which every firm repurchases shares. If ωJ = g
¡
εU
¢ · xUJ ¡w02 , w02 , q, εU¢ for some εU ∈ A, market clearing
holds iff q solves
g
¡
εU
¢ · xUi,J ¡w02 , w02 , q, εU¢+ ¡1− g ¡εU¢¢ · xIi,J ¡ωJ , w02 , w02 , q, εI¢ = 1 (7)
Let q
¡
εU , εI
¢
be the solution to equation (7).14
Proposition 5.4 AME with J = {1, 2} exists if and only if
R.1 δ
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
¡
εU , εI
¢¢
> δ.
R.2 0 < ωJ 0 = g
¡
εU
¢ · xUJ ¡w02 , w02 , q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢ < ¡12 , 12¢ for every J 0 ∈ P .15
R.3∆J
¡
ωJ , w02 ,
w0
2 , q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, xJ
¡·, εU¢¢ ≤ f < ∆{i} ¡ω{i}, w02 , w02 , q ¡εU , εI¢ , xJ ¡·, εI¢¢ for some i.
Condition R.2 says that in aME in which both firms repurchase shares, some investors remain uninformed
in the event a repurchase takes place. Those investors, however, do not hold a majority of shares in any firm.
Therefore, as expressed by condition R.3, the cost of acquiring information must be high enough to discourage
some shareholders to purchase information but not too high so that the rest still purchase information even if
one firm deviates and pays dividends.
In a ME with J = {1, 2}, investors differ in their decision about purchasing information in the event a
payout takes place. As a consequence, there is a wedge between the rate of return per share of the optimistic
14 Since the left hand side equals zero at q =
W0
2
1−α
θ+c
and is strictly increasing in q, a solution to the equation above exists iff
lim
q→
(wo2 )
1−α
θL+c
g
?
ε0
? · xUi,J
?
w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q, ε
0?+
?
1− g
?
ε0
?? · xIi,J
?
ωJJ , w02 ,
w0
2 , q, ε
00? ≥ 1.
15 For any vectors x, y ∈ <2, x > y means that xi > yi for every i = 1, 2.
16
and the pessimistic investors, which causes that their marginal utility of wealth must differ in some state s at
date 2. Therefore, markets are effectively incomplete. The following Lemma shows a stronger result: agents
disagree on the price of risk. For k ∈ {I, U}, let wkJ ≡ w
¡
rkJ , p, q, x
k
J
¢
be the wealth of an agent who holds
portfolio xkJ and faces rates of return rkJ .
Lemma 5.1 If {J ,Ω, x, (p1, p2, q)} is a ME with J = {1, 2}, then MRS
£
EεU
¡
wUJ
¢
, varεU
¡
wUJ
¢¤
<
MRS
£
EεI
¡
wIJ
¢
, varεI
¡
wIJ
¢¤
.
In the equilibria analyzed so far, the shares of both firms trade at the same price. However, this need not be
the case if firms choose different payout methods. In the next section, I characterize the equilibrium price of
shares of firms which are expected to choose different payout policies.
5.2 Asymmetric Equilibrium
If {(p1, p2, q) ,J , ωJ } is an asymmetricME, then Proposition 5.2 implies that p1+p2 = w0. The question
I analyze in this section is which payout method raises more capital in the financial market. I show that in any
asymmetric equilibrium, the firm expected to pay dividends raises more capital than an otherwise identical firm
expected to repurchase shares.
To fix ideas, suppose firm j pays dividends and firm i repurchases shares. For any k ∈ {I, U}, the wealth
of an investor who purchases (x1, x2) shares is w
¡
rkJ , p, q, x
¢
= xi ·
³
rki −
pi
q
´
+ xj ·
³
rDj −
pj
q
´
+ wq . Let
η ≡ pi·xipi·xi+pj ·xj . Therefore, the mean and variance of wealth associated with portfolio (x1, x2) is
Eε
³
wkJ
´
=
∙
η ·
µ
Eε
³
rki
pi
´
− 1
q
¶
+ (1− η) ·
µ
Eε
³
rDj
pj
´
− 1
q
¶¸
· (pi · xi + pj · xj) + wq
var
³
wkJ
´
=
h
η2 · varε
³
rki
pi
´
+ (1− η)2 · varε
³
rDj
pj
´i
· (pi · xi + pj · xj)2
If the investor is not satiated, as it is the case in any ME under assumption NS, the expression above implies
that she allocates a positive fraction of wealth to the shares of both firms only if
Eε
³
rki
pi
´
< Eε
³
rDj
pj
´
⇒ varε
³
rki
pi
´
< varε
³
rDj
pj
´
for k ∈ {U, I} (8)
Eε
³
rDj
pj
´
< Eε
³
rki
pi
´
⇒ varε
³
rDj
pj
´
< varε
³
rki
pi
´
for k ∈ {U, I} (9)
When α = 1, r
k
i
pi and
rDj
pj are independent of (pi, pj). For the would-be uninformed investor, the rate of return
of firm i has lower mean and higher variance than the rate of return of firm j, i.e. Eε
³
rUi
pi
´
< Eε
³
rDj
pj
´
and
varε
³
rDj
pj
´
< varε
³
rki
pi
´
for any ε ∈ A. Hence, condition (8) is violated. Because of this, in this section, I
consider only the cases in which α ∈ (0, 1). It is important to observe that when α ∈ (0, 1), in principle, one
can always find prices (p1, p2) such that conditions (8) and (9) hold. Therefore, to address the question posed
above, one has to use some equilibrium conditions. I turn to that problem now.
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First, I argue that in any asymmetric equilibrium some shareholders remain uninformed while some others
acquire information in the event a repurchase takes place. The explanation is as follows. If only firm
i repurchased shares, then an open market repurchase in which everybody obtains information would be
equivalent to a dividend payment. It follows that every shareholder would prefer firm i to pay dividends to
avoid paying the fixed cost of acquiring information. Therefore, if the majority of shareholders of firm i prefers
an open market repurchase, it must be the case they anticipate that some shareholders will remain uninformed.
That is, ωi,JJ > 0. Because information rents are infinitely large when everybody else remains uninformed
and the cost of acquiring information is finite, it must be the case that some investors do obtain information
when firm i announces a repurchase. That is ωJ = g
¡
εU
¢ ·xJ ¡ωJ , p, q, εU¢ for some εU ∈ {ε, ε} as stated in
A.1 below. Since the returns of firms are independent and agents are nonsatiated, it follows that both investors
hold a positive fraction of each firm. This is condition A.2. Condition A.3 follows because, on the one hand,
the majority in firm i prefers repurchases and, on the other hand, the informed investors’ ownership of the
dividend paying firm is bounded away from zero. Finally, since the incentives to gather information in the
event the two firms conduct an OMR are larger than when only one does it, agents conjecture that at most
g
¡
εU
¢ · xJ ¡ωJ , p, q, εU¢ shares would be in hands of the uninformed if both firms were to repurchase shares.
This is the content of condition A.1.
Proposition 5.5 If {J ,Ω, x, (p1, p2, q)} is aME with J = {i}, then
A.1 ωJ 0 ≤ ωJ = g
¡
εU
¢ · xUJ ¡p, q, εU¢ for J 0 = {1, 2}.
A.2 ωh,J ∈ (0, 1) for h = 1, 2.
A.3 ωi,J < 12 .
Since the optimal portfolio of investor ε is interior, it equalizes the price of risk of each asset to her marginal
rate of substitution between mean and variance of wealth. That is,
EεU

rUi −
pi
q

xUi,J (p,q,εU )·varεU (rUi ) =
E

rDj −
pj
q

xUj,J (p,q,εU)·var(rDj )
= δ
1−δEεU
k
xUi,J (·,εU )·

rUi −
pi
q

+xUj,J (·,εU )·

rDj −
pj
q

+wq
l
EεI

rIi−
pi
q

xIi,J (ωJ ,p,q,εI)·varεI (rIi ) =
E

rDj −
pj
q

xIj,J (ωJ ,p,q,εI)·var(rDj )
= δ
1−δ·EεI
k
xIi,J (·,εI)·

rIi−
pi
q

+xIj,J (·,εI)·

rDj −
pj
q

+wq
l
The following Lemma shows that in any asymmetricME agents disagree on the price of risk. Thus, markets
are effectively incomplete.
Lemma 5.2 If {J ,Ω, x, (p1, p2, q)} is a ME with J = {i}, then MRS
£
EεU
¡
wUJ
¢
, varεU
¡
wUJ
¢¤
<
MRS
£
EεI
¡
wIJ
¢
, varεI
¡
wIJ
¢¤
and ωi,J < ωj,J .
The main question I want to address in this section is whether a firm that repurchases shares can raise
more financial capital than an otherwise identical firm that pays dividends. That is, can it exist a ME such
that pi ≥ pj? I argue that this can never happen provided agents do not disagree much about the likelihood
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a distribution takes place at date 1. Since the shares of the dividend paying firm do not suffer from adverse
selection, investors agree on the Sharpe ratio of firm j. That is,
EεU
³
rUi −
pi
q
´
varεU
¡
rUi
¢ · xUj,J ¡ωJ , p, q, εU¢
xUi,J (ωJ , p, q, εU )
=
E
³
rDj −
pj
q
´
var
³
rDj
´
EεI
³
rIi −
pi
q
´
varεI
¡
rIi
¢ · xIj,J ¡ωJ , p, q, εI¢
xIi,J (ωJ , p, q, εI)
=
E
³
rDj −
pj
q
´
var
³
rDj
´
Manipulating these conditions one obtains that
ωj,J ·EεU
³
rUi −
pi
q
´
+ (1− ωj,J ) ·EεI
³
rIi −
pi
q
´
ωi,J · varεU
¡
rUi
¢
+ (1− ωi,J ) · varεI
¡
rIi
¢ = E
³
rDj −
pj
q
´
var
³
rDj
´ (10)
That is, (p1, p2, q) is a DE in a representative agent economy where agent i holds all the stock of both
companies, she has correct beliefs about firm j’s rate of return but she believes firm i offers an expected return
per share of ωj,J ·EεU
¡
rUi
¢
+(1− ωj,J ) ·EεI
¡
rIi
¢
and variance per share of ωi,J · varεU
¡
rUi
¢
+(1− ωi,J ) ·
varεI
¡
rIi
¢
.
To see the intuition behind the result that pi < pj , it is useful to rewrite (10) as
¡
θ + c
¢
+ e (ωJ )− p
1−α
i
q
ωi,J · varεU
³
rUi
pαi
´
+ (1− ωi,J ) · varεI
³
rIi
pαi
´ · 1
pαi
=
¡
θ + c
¢
− p
1−α
j
q
σ2
· 1
pαj
where
e (ωJ ) ≡
µ
−ωj,J · εU + (1− ωj,J ) · ωi,J
1− ωi,J
· εI
¶
· π · τ · c (11)
is the weighted difference between the subjective expected gain and loss per capita of the informed and the
uninformed when an OMR takes place.16 Hence, to argue that it cannot be the case that pi ≥ pj , it suffices to
show that the following two conditions hold
ωi,J · varεU
µ
rUi
pαi
¶
+ (1− ωi,J ) · varεI
µ
rIi
pαi
¶
> σ2 (12)
e (ωJ ) < 0 (13)
Consider first the case in which εU = εI = ε. Since ωi,J · r
U
i
pαi
+(1− ωi,J )· r
I
i
pαi
= θi+c for any ωi,J ∈ (0, 1)
16 The agent who anticipates she will remain uninformed in the event an OMR takes place, expects a loss per share of ε0 · π · τ · c,
compared to the case in which firm i distributes cash by means of dividends. However, the shareholder who anticipates she will become
informed expects a gain per share of ε00 · π · τ · c · ωi,J
1−ωi,J
. The expected net transfer under the true probability distribution, therefore,
is zero. Expression (11) differs from the true expected net transfer in two aspects. On the one hand, it underestimates the true expected
net transfer because ωj,JJ > ωi,JJ . On the other hand, it uses the agents’s beliefs about the occurrence of an OMR.
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and variance is a strictly convex function,
ωi,J · varε
³
rUi
pαi
´
+ (1− ωi,J ) · varε
³
rIi
pαi
´
> varε
³
ωi,J · r
U
i
pαi
+ (1− ωi,J ) · r
I
i
pαi
´
= var (θi + c) = σ
2
Rearranging terms in expression (11), it is straightforward to see that
e (ωJ ) ≡
µ
1− ωj,J
1− ωi,J
· ωi,J
ωj,J
− 1
¶
· ωj,J · εI · π · τ · c < 0
since Lemma 5.2 implies that 1−ωj,J1−ωi,J ·
ωi,J
ωj,J < 1. Hence, both (12) and (13) holds for ε
U = εI = ε and,
therefore, pi < pj . A continuity argument shows that these conditions also hold for εU close to εI .
Proposition 5.6 Suppose {J ,Ω, x, (p1, p2, q)} is a ME with J = {i}. There exists κ ∈ (0, 1) sucht that
εU/εI ≥ κ implies that pi < w02 < pj . In particular, it holds whenever εU = ε and εI = ε.
Proposition 5.6 shows that if investors do not disagree much about the probability that a distribution takes
place, a firm that pays dividends raises more capital in the financial market than an otherwise identical firm
which repurchases shares. Therefore, the market share of the dividend paying firm exceeds, ceteris paribus,
that of a firm which conducts open market repurchases. One concludes that financial markets favor firms which
choose to payout through dividends.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The choice of method to use to distribute cash to the firm’s shareholders is one of the fundamental
decisions that managers take. As Brennan and Thakor show, that choice is not a matter of indifference for the
shareholders. Therefore, it is important to asses the effect that the expectation about the payout method has
on asset prices as well as the output decisions of the firm. I show that a firm expected to payout dividends
faces a lower cost of capital and raises more funds than an otherwise identical firm expected to repurchases
shares. In addition, ex-ante identical firms can choose different payout methods. Therefore, this model allows
for the managers to differ in their objectives without entering into conict with the preferences of the majority
of shareholders. A manager whose objectives dictate that she should maximize the market share of the firm
chooses to pay dividends, while a manager who wants to favor the would-be informed shareholders may choose
to repurchase shares. Therefore, this model gives some intuition on how the market selects among managers
that have objectives which do not enter into conict with the interests of the shareholders’ majority.
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APPENDIX
The following Proposition shows that the absence of arbitrage opportunities together with the requirement
that the value of assets add up to initial wealth imply that asset prices are uniformly bounded.
Proposition 6.1 If (p1, p2, q) ∈ Ψ, there exists l, l and u such that 0 < l < pi, q < u < +∞ and
pi − (θL + c) · pαi · q ≥ l.
Proof of Proposition 6.1: Suppose (p1, p2, q) ∈ <3+ satisfies (4) and p1 + p2 = w0. Since p
1−α
i
q > θL + c,
there exists l > 0 such that pi−(θL + c)·pαi ·q ≥ l. Clearly pi ≤ w0 for i = 1, 2. Since θL+c ≤ p
1−α
i
q , it follows
that q ≤ w
1−α
0
θL+c . If one defines u = max
n
w0,
w1−α0
θL+c
o
, then pi, q ≤ u < +∞. Suppose there is no lower bound
for q. Then, there exists {pm, qm} ∈ Ψ such that qm → 0. Since (pm1 )1−αqm ≤ θH + c, it follows that pm1 → 0 and
pm2 → w0. But then,
(pm1 )
1−α
qm → ∞, a contradiction. It follows that there exists l0 > 0 such that l0 ≤ q. Since,
θL + c ≤ p
1−α
i
q , it follows that pi ≥ [(θL + c) · l0]
1
1−α > 0. If one defines l = min
n
l0, [(θL + c) · l0]
1
1−α
o
, then
pi, q > l > 0, as desired. ¥
It should be easy to see that whenever (p, q) ∈ Ψ, to require wealth to be nonnegative in every state, i.e.
w (r1, r2, p, q, x) (s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S, implies that x ∈ B where
B ≡
½
x ∈ <2+ : xi ≤
w
l
, ∀i = 1, 2
¾
is a compact set. Thus, for each price vector in Ψ the set of portfolios such that the agent’s wealth is non-
negative in every state is a compact set of <2+.
Lemma 6.1 Suppose (p, q) ∈ Ψ, ri : S×<+ 7→<+ is homogeneous of degree α in pi, xi (r, p, q, ε) > 0 for
some asset i ∈ {1, 2} and 1− δ ·Eε [w (r1, r2, p, q, x (·))] > 0. If Eε(ri)pαi =
Eε(rj)
pαj
and varε
³
ri
pαi
´
= varε
³
rj
pαj
´
then xi (r, p, q, ε) > xj (r, p, q, ε) if and only if pi < pj .
Proof of Lemma 6.1: Suppose (p, q) ∈ Ψ, ri : S×<+ 7→<+ is homogeneous of degree α in pi,
xi (r, p, q, ε) > 0 for some asset i ∈ {1, 2} and 1− δ · Eε [w (r1, r2, p, q, x (·))] > 0. Assume Eε(ri)pαi =
Eε(rj)
pαj
and varε
³
ri
pαi
´
= varε
³
rj
pαj
´
.
First I show that for xj (r, p, q, ε) > 0, it is true that xi (r, p, q, ε) > xj (r, p, q, ε) ⇔ pi < pj . Since
xi (r, p, q, ε) > 0, the necessary conditions for an interior global maximum are that
Eε

ri−
pi
q

varε

ri
pαi

·(pαi )2·xi+covε

ri
pαi
,
rj
pαj

·pαj ·pαi ·xj
=
Eε

rj−
pj
q

varε

rj
pαj

·(pαj )
2·xj+covε

ri
pαi
,
rj
pαj

·pαi ·pαj ·xi
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dividing numerator and denominator by pαi on the left hand side and by pαj on the right hand side one obtains
Eε
³
ri
pαi
− p
1−α
i
q
´
varε
³
ri
pαi
´
· pαi · xi + covε
³
ri
pαi
, rjpαj
´
· pαj · xj
=
Eε
³
rj
pαj
− p
1−α
j
q
´
varε
³
rj
pαj
´
· pαj · xj + covε
³
ri
pαi
, rjpαj
´
· pαi · xi
and since Eε(ri)pαi =
Eε(rj)
pαj
, it follows that
pi < pj ⇔ varε
³
ri
pαi
´
· pαi · xi + covε
µ
ri
pαi
, rjpαj
¶
· pαj · xj > varε
³
rj
pαj
´
· pαj · xj + covε
³
ri
pαi
, rjpαj
´
· pαi · xi
⇔
"
varε
µ
ri
pαi
¶
− covε
Ã
ri
pαi
,
rj
pαj
!#
· pαi · xi >
"
varε
Ã
rj
pαj
!
− covε
Ã
ri
pαi
,
rj
pαj
!#
· pαj · xj
⇔ pαi · xi > pαj · xj
where the last line follows from the assumption that varε
³
ri
pαi
´
= varε
³
rj
pαj
´
and the Cauchy Schwarz
inequality which together imply that varε
³
ri
pαi
´
− covε
³
ri
pαi
, rjpαj
´
> 0. It follows that xj (r, p, q, ε) > 0 implies
xi (r, p, q, ε) > xj (r, p, q, ε)⇔ pi < pj
Now suppose xj (r, p, q, ε) = 0. Clearly, the equivalence above can only fail if pj ≥ pi. From the first order
conditions
(1− δ ·Eε [w (·)]) ·Eε
³
rj
pαj
− p
1−α
j
q
´
≤ δ · xi · cov
³
ri
pαi
, rjpαj
´
· pαi
(1− δ ·Eε [w (·)]) ·Eε
³
ri
pαi
− p
1−α
i
q
´
= δ · xi · var
³
ri
pαi
´
· pαi
and since (1− δ ·Eε [w (·)]) > 0 and Eε(ri)pαi =
Eε(rj)
pαj
, it follows that δ · xi · cov
³
ri
pαi
, rjpαj
´
· pαi ≥
δ · xi · var
³
ri
pαi
´
· pαi . Since xi (r, p, q, ε) > 0, δ > 0 and pi > 0, this implies cov
³
ri
pαi
, rjpαj
´
≥ var
³
ri
pαi
´
, a
contradiction because the assumption varε
³
ri
pαi
´
= varε
³
rj
pαj
´
together with the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
imply that varε
³
ri
pαi
´
− covε
³
ri
pαi
, rjpαj
´
> 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Let (p1, p2, q) be a DE. By definition, B (p1, p2, q) = w0 − p1 · XD1 (p, q) −
p2 · XD2 (p, q). Since in equilibrium B (p1, p2, q) = 0 and XDi
¡
rD, p, q
¢
= 1 for all i = 1, 2, it follows
that p1 + p2 = w0. To get a contradiction, suppose p1 6= p2. Without loss of generality assume p1 < p2.
Since XDi
¡
rD, p, q
¢
= xi
¡
rD, p, q, ε
¢
, it follows by Lemma 6.1 that XD1
¡
rD, p, q
¢
> XD2
¡
rD, p, q
¢
= 1, a
contradiction. One concludes that p1 = p2 = w02 , as desired. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Suppose assumption NS holds. By proposition 3.1, p1 = p2 = w02 . In addition, q
22
solvesXDi
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
¢
= 1 if and only if
1− δw0q
δw02
θ+c−
(w02 )
1−α
q
σ2+2·
⎡
⎣θ+c−
(w02 )
1−α
q
⎤
⎦
2 = 1⇔ q =
¡w0
2
¢1−α 1δw0 · ¡w02 ¢1−α − ¡θ + c¢¡
θ + c
¢ · ³ 1δw0 ¡w02 ¢1−α − ¡θ + c¢´− σ22 ≡ q
∗
It follows that if a DE exists then it is unique. I shall show that
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
∗¢ is a DE. It suffices to show that
q∗ > 0, that is
¡
θ + c
¢ ·µ 1
δ · w0 ·
³w0
2
´1−α
−
¡
θ + c
¢¶
− σ
2
2
> 0
Rearranging terms, one needs to show that
1
δ
>
³w0
2
´α · 2 · ¡θ + c¢2 + π · (1− π) · (θH − θL)2
θ + c
and since assumption NS holds, it suffices to show that 2·(θ+c)+π·(1−π)·(θH−θL)
2
θ+c
< 2 · (θH + c). Notice that
2·(θ+c)2+π·(1−π)·(θH−θL)2
θ+c
< 2 · (θH + c) ⇔ 2 ·
¡
θ + c
¢2
+ π · (1− π) · (θH − θL)2 < 2 ·
¡
θ + c
¢ · (θH + c)
⇔ π · (1− π) · (θH − θL)2 < 2 ·
¡
θ + c
¢ · ¡θH − θ¢
⇔ (1− π) · (θH − θL)2 < 2 ·
¡
θ + c
¢ · (θH − θL)
⇔ (1− π) · (θH − θL) < 2 ·
¡
θ + c
¢
⇔ (1− π) · (θH − θL) < 2 · ((1− π) · (θH − θL) + θL + c)
⇔ 0 < (1− π) · (θH − θL) + 2 · (θL + c)
which is always true since θH − θL > 0 and (θL + c) > 0. Hence,
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
∗¢ is the unique DE. Next, I show
that
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
∗¢ ∈ Ψ. First notice that
¡w0
2
¢1−α
q∗
=
(θ+c)·

1
δw0
(w02 )
1−α−(θ+c)

−σ2
2
1
δw0
·(w02 )
1−α−(θ+c)
=
¡
θ + c
¢
−
σ2
2
1
δw0
·(w02 )
1−α−(θ+c)
< θH + c
where the last inequality uses the fact that 1δw0 ·
¡w0
2
¢1−α− ¡θ + c¢ > 1δ·w0 · ¡w02 ¢1−α− ¡θ + c¢− σ22·(θ+c) > 0.
So it suffices to show that
(w02 )
1−α
q∗ > θL + c ⇔
1
δw0
·(w02 )
1−α−(θ+c)
(θ+c)·

1
δw0
(w02 )
1−α−(θ+c)

−σ2
2
< 1θL+c
⇔
¡w0
2
¢α · 2·(θ+c)2+π·(1−π)·(θH−θL)2−2·(θ+c)·(θL+c)
θ−θL
< 1δ
and since assumption NS holds, it suffices to show that 2·(θ+c)
2
+π·(1−π)·(θH−θL)2−2·(θ+c)·(θL+c)
θ−θL
< 2 ·(θH + c).
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Notice that
2·(θ+c)2+π·(1−π)·(θH−θL)2−2·(θ+c)·(θL+c)
θ−θL
< 2 · (θH + c)
⇔ π · (1− π) · (θH − θL)2 + 2 ·
¡
θ + c
¢ · ¡θ − θL¢ < 2 · (θH + c) · ¡θ − θL¢
⇔ π · (θH − θL) ·
¡
θ − θL
¢
+ 2 · ¡θ + c¢ · ¡θ − θL¢ < 2 · (θH + c) · ¡θ − θL¢
⇔ π · (θH − θL) < 2 ·
¡
θH − θ
¢
⇔ π · (θH − θL) < 2 · π · (θH − θL)
which is always true since π · (θH − θL) > 0. It follows that
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
∗¢ ∈ Ψ, as desired. ¥
Lemma 6.2 Let (p, q) ∈ Ψ. If every uninformed investor follows bγU and every informed investor follows bγI ,
there is δI (p, q) such that for all 0 < δ < δI (p, q) no informed investor wants to deviate unilaterally from bγI .
Proof of Lemma 6.2: Since the action of a single informed investor neither affects the price quoted by the
market maker nor the round in which the OMR ends, the set of rates of return associated with the strategies of
an informed agent is
RIi ≡
©
ri = φ
I
i · rIi +
¡
1− φIi
¢ · r0i where φIi : S 7→ [0, 1] is F−measurableª
where
r0i (s) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
¡
θ + c
¢ · pαi if θi (s) = θH & d (s) = 1
(θL + c · (1− τ)) · pαi if θi (s) = θL & d (s) = 1
(θi (s) + c) · pαi otherwise
Clearly, rIi (ωi) dominates r0i, that is rIi (ωi) (s) ≥ r0i (s) for all s ∈ S and there is some s in which the inequality
is strict.
I would like to argue that if every other informed shareholder follows strategy bγI and every uninformed
shareholder follows bγU , each informed shareholder finds it optimal to follow bγI regardless of her portfolio.
There are two cases to consider, depending on whether only one or both firms repurchase shares. Formally, bγI
is optimal for the informed shareholder regardless of her portfolio and the identity of the firms that announce
an OMR if
u
£
w
¡
rI1, r
I
2, p, q, x
¢
(s)
¤
≥ u [w (r1, r2, p, q, x) (s)] ∀x ∈ B, ∀ (r1, r2) ∈ RI1 ×RI2, ∀s ∈ S1 (14)
u
£
w
¡
rIi , r
D
−i, p, q, x
¢
(s)
¤
≥ u
£
w
¡
ri, r
D
−i, p, q, x
¢
(s)
¤
∀x ∈ B, ∀ri ∈ RIi , ∀s ∈ S1 (15)
where the first inequality corresponds to the case in which both firms repurchase shares and the second one to
the case in which only one firm performs a repurchase.
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Since an agent who follows bγI maximizes her wealth in each state, she may only find it optimal to deviate
if she is satiated in some state. Therefore, to show that (14) - (15) holds is equivalent to argue that for every
portfolio in the compact set B and every state s the agent is not satiated. Since portfolios are in a compact set
and the assets return is bounded then the investors wealth is also bounded and, therefore, condition (1) holds
provided δ is not too large as the following argument shows.
First notice that w (r1, r2, p, q, x) (s) ≤ w
¡
rI1, r
I
2, p, q, x
¢
(s) for all x ∈ B, (r1, r2) ∈ RI1×RI2 and s ∈ S1.
Therefore, to show that (14) and (15) holds, it suffices to argue that when φ (s) = 1 for all s ∈ S1, the marginal
utility of wealth is positive in every state s ∈ S1, i.e. (1) holds at every s ∈ S1. Since rIi (s) ≤ (θH + c) · pαi , it
follows that
w
¡
rI1, r
I
2, p, q, x
¢
(s) ≤
h
(θH + c) · pα1 − p1q
i
· x1 +
h
(θH + c) · pα2 − p2q
i
· x2 + w0q
Now, let
δI (p, q) ≡ min
x∈B
1k
(θH+c)·pα1− p1q
l
·x1+
k
(θH+c)·pα2−p2q
l
·x2+w0q
Since B is a compact set and the objective function is continuous in x, it follows that δI (p, q) is well defined.
Then,
w
¡
rI1, r
I
2, p, q, x
¢
(s) <
1
δI (p, q)
<
1
δ
for any 0 < δ < δI (p, q), as desired. ¥
Let (p, q) ∈ Ψ. If every uninformed investor follows bγU and every informed investor follows bγI , there is
δU (p, q) such that for all 0 < δ < δU (p, q) no uninformed investor wants to deviate unilaterally from bγU .
Proof of Lemma 15: The rate of return obtained by an uninformed shareholder who tenders in the first
round is
rT1i (ωi) (s) ≡
( ¡
θ + c
¢ · pαi if θi (s) = θH³
θL + c+
ωi
1−ωi · τ · c
´
· pαi if θi (s) = θL
and E
³
rT1i kS1
´
(s) =
h
θ + c− π · τ ·
³
c+ θ − c1−ωi
´i
· pαi . Therefore,
E
¡
rUi kS1
¢
(s) > E
³
rT1i kS1
´
(s)⇔ 1− ωi >
c
θ
(16)
Notice also that to tender in the second round is never better than not tendering at all for the uninformed
shareholder. Indeed, if she follows the strategy of tendering in the second round, then her rate of return per
share is
rT2i (s) =
½
(θi + c) · pαi if θi = θH
(θL + c− τ · c) · pαi if θi = θL and d (s) = 1
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and, therefore, rUi (s) ≥ r
T2
i (s) for all s ∈ S1. So we can assume the uninformed either tender in the first round
or does not tender at all.
Since the action of a single uninformed investor neither affects the price quoted by the market maker nor the
round in which the OMR ends, the set of rates of return associated with the strategies of the uninformed is
RUi ≡
n
ri = φ
U
i · rUi +
¡
1− φUi
¢ · rT1i where φUi ∈ [0, 1]o
Formally, bγU is optimal for the uninformed shareholder regardless of her portfolio and the identity of the
firms that announce an OMR if
E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rU1 , r
U
2 , p, q, x
¢¤
− u [w (r1, r2, p, q, x)] kS1
¢
(s) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ B, ∀ (r1, r2) ∈ RI1 ×RI2
E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rUi , r
D
−i, p, q, x
¢¤
− u
£
w
¡
ri, r
D
−i, p, q, x
¢¤ kS1 ¢ (s) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ B, ∀ri ∈ RUi , ∀i = 1, 2
where the first inequality corresponds to the case in which the two firms repurchase shares and the second one
to the case in which only one of them performs a repurchase. Since the investor is uninformed and her objective
function is concave in φUi , the expressions above are equivalent to
DφUi E
¡
u
£
w
¡
φUi · rUi +
¡
1− φUi
¢ · r0i, rU−i, p, q, x¢¤ kS1 ¢ (s)¯¯¯φUi =1 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ B,∀i ∈ J (17)
DφUi E
¡
u
£
w
¡
φUi · rUi +
¡
1− φUi
¢ · r0i, rD−i, p, q, x¢¤ kS1 ¢ (s)¯¯¯φUi =1 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ B,∀i ∈ J (18)
whereDx denotes the partial derivative with respect to x.
Let (p, q) ∈ Ψ, x ∈ B and i ∈ J . Notice that for r−i ∈
©
rU−i, r
D
−i
ª
DφUi E
¡
u
£
w
¡
φUi · rUi +
¡
1− φUi
¢ · r0i, r−i, p, q, x¢¤ kS1 ¢ (s)¯¯¯φUi =1 > 0⇔ E(rUi −r
T1
i kS1 )
E[w(rUi ,r−i,p,q,x)·(rUi −rT1i )kS1 ]
> δ
However, since E
¡
rU−i kS1
¢
< E
¡
rD−i kS1
¢
and rUi is conditionally independent of rD−i,
E(rUi −r
T1
i kS1 )
E[w(rU1 ,rU2 ,p,q,x)·(rUi −rT1i )kS1 ]
≥ E(r
U
i −r
T1
i kS1 )
E[w(rUi ,rD−i,p,q,x)·(rUi −rT1i )kS1 ]
then it suffices to show that the right hand side exceeds δ. Define
δU (p, q) ≡ min
x∈B
Eε(rUi −r
T1
i kS1 )
Eε[w(rUi ,rD−i,p,q,x)·(rUi −rT1i )kS1 ]
Then, for all 0 < δ < δU (p, q) and r−i ∈
©
rU−i, r
D
−i
ª
,
δ < δU (p, q) ≤ E(r
U
i −r
T1
i kS1 )
E[w(rUi ,r−i,p,q,x)·(rUi −rT1i )kS1 ]
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Therefore, (17) and (18) holds, as desired.¥
Proof of Lemma 4.1: Set δ (p, q) = min
©
δU (p, q) , δI (p, q)
ª
and the desired results follows by Lemmas
6.2 and 15. ¥
Proof of Lemma 4.2: Suppose δ < δI and J 0 ∈ P. First I show property (i). By definition
∆J 0 (ω, p, q, x) ≡ E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ 0 , p, q, x
¢¤ |S1 ¢−E ¡u £w ¡rUJ 0 , p, q, x¢¤ |S1 ¢
Since rUJ 0 is constant with respect to ω, ∆J 0 (ω, p, q, x) increases with ω if and only if
E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ 0 , p, q, x
¢¤ |S1 ¢ does. Let w ¡rIJ 0 , ·¢ = w ¡rIJ 0 , p, q, x¢. Notice that
E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ 0 , ·
¢¤ |S1 ¢ = E ¡w ¡rIJ 0 , ·¢ |S1 ¢ · ¡1− δ2 ·E ¡w ¡rIJ 0 , ·¢ |S1 ¢¢− δ2 · var ¡w ¡rIJ 0 , ·¢ |S1 ¢
where
E
¡
w
¡
rIJ 0 , ·
¢ |S1 ¢ = E ³rI1,J 0 − p1q |S1´ · x1 +E ³rI2,J 0 − p2q |S1´ · x2 + wq (19)
var
¡
w
¡
rIJ 0 , ·
¢ |S1 ¢ = var ¡rI1,J 0 |S1 ¢ · x1 + var ¡rI2,J 0 |S1 ¢ · x2 (20)
where the last line uses the property that cov
³
rI1,J 0 , r
I
2,J 0 |S1
´
= 0 for every J 0 ∈ P. Since δ < δI , it follows
that∆J 0 (ω, p, q, x) increases withE
¡
w
¡
rIJ 0 , ·
¢ |S1 ¢ and decreases with var ¡w ¡rIJ 0 , ·¢ |S1 ¢. So it suffices to
show that E
¡
w
¡
rIJ 0 , ·
¢ |S1 ¢ and var ¡w ¡rIJ 0 , ·¢ |S1 ¢ increases and decreases with ω, respectively. On the one
hand, for every i /∈ J 0, E
³
rIi,J 0 |S1
´
and var
³
rIi,J 0 |S1
´
are constant with respect to ω. On the other hand,
for every i ∈ J 0, E
³
rIi,J 0 |S1
´
= E
¡
rIi |S1
¢
increases with ω and var
³
rIi,J 0 |S1
´
= var
¡
rIi |S1
¢
decreases
with ω. It follows from (19) and (20) that∆J 0 (ω, p, q, x) increases with ω, as desired.
Now I show property (ii) holds. Suppose J ⊂ J 0. Let ω ∈ [0, 1). Since E
³
rIi,J |S1
´
≤
E
³
rIi,J 0 |S1
´
and var
³
rIi,J |S1
´
≥ var
³
rIi,J 0 |S1
´
∀i = 1, 2, then E
¡
w
¡
rIJ , ·
¢ |S1 ¢ ≤
E
¡
w
¡
rIJ 0 , ·
¢ |S1 ¢ and var ¡w ¡rIJ , ·¢ |S1 ¢ ≥ var ¡w ¡rIJ 0 , ·¢ |S1 ¢. Therefore, E ¡u £w ¡rIJ , p, q, x¢¤ |S1 ¢ ≤
E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ 0 , p, q, x
¢¤ |S1 ¢. Likewise, since E ³rUi,J |S1´ ≥ E ³rUi,J 0 |S1´ and var ³rUi,J |S1´ ≤
var
³
rUi,J 0 |S1
´
∀i = 1, 2, E
¡
w
¡
rUJ , ·
¢ |S1 ¢ ≥ E ¡w ¡rUJ 0 , ·¢ |S1 ¢ and var ¡w ¡rUJ , ·¢ |S1 ¢ ≤
var
¡
w
¡
rUJ 0 , ·
¢ |S1 ¢. Therefore, E ¡u £w ¡rUJ , p, q, x¢¤ |S1 ¢ ≥ E ¡u £w ¡rUJ 0 , p, q, x¢¤ |S1 ¢. Thus,
∆J (ω, p, q, x) = E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ , p, q, x
¢¤ |S1 ¢−E ¡u £w ¡rUJ , p, q, x¢¤ |S1 ¢
≤ E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ 0 , p, q, x
¢¤ |S1 ¢−E ¡u £w ¡rUJ 0 , p, q, x¢¤ |S1 ¢ = ∆J 0 (ω, p, q, x)
as desired. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.1: Suppose {(p1, p2, q) ,J , ωJ } is a ME, NS holds and ωi,J < 1 for some firm
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i = 1, 2. By E.2 there exists some agent εI for whom xJ
¡
ωJ , p, q, εI
¢
= xIJ
¡
ωJ , p, q, εI
¢
. Suppose there
exists some agent εU for whom xJ
¡
ωJ , p, q, εU
¢
= xUJ
¡
p, q, εU
¢
. Then,
w
¡
rUJ , p, q, ε
U¢ = ³rU1,J − p1q ´ · xU1,J ¡p, q, εU¢+ ³rU2,J − p2q ´ · xU2,J ¡p, q, εU¢+ wq
w
¡
rIJ , p, q, ε
I¢ = ³rI1,J − p1q ´ · xI1,J ¡ωJ , p, q, εI¢+ ³rI2,J − p2q ´ · xI2,J ¡ωJ , p, q, εI¢+ wq
It follows that
g
¡
εU
¢ · w ¡rUJ , p, q, εU¢+ ¡1− g ¡εU¢¢ · w ¡rIJ , p, q, εI¢ = X
i=1,2
£
rUi,J · ωi,J + rIi,J · (1− ωi,JJ )
¤
=
X
i=1,2
(θi + c) · pαi
≤
X
i=1,2
¡
θH + c
¢ · pαi
=
¡
θH + c
¢ · £¡p1w ¢α + ¡p2w ¢α¤ · wα
≤ 2 · ¡θH + c¢ · ¡w2 ¢α
and since w
¡
rUJ , p, q, ε
U¢ (s) , w ¡rIJ , p, q, εI¢ (s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S, then
max
©
w
¡
rUJ , p, q, ε
U¢ (s) , w ¡rIJ , p, q, εI¢ (s)ª < 2·(θH+c)·(w2 )αmin{λ,1−λ} < 1δ for all s ∈ S
as desired. Now, suppose everybody is informed. Then, ωJ = 0 ≡ (0, 0) and rIi,J = (θi + c) · pαi for all
i = 1, 2. Then,
g
¡
εU
¢ · w ¡rIJ , p, q, εU¢+ ¡1− g ¡εU¢¢ · w ¡rIJ , p, q, εI¢ = X
i=1,2
(θi + c) · pαi ≤ 2 ·
¡
θH + c
¢ · ³w
2
´α
and since w
¡
rIJ , p, q, ε
U¢ (s) , w ¡rIJ , p, q, εI¢ (s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S, then
max
©
w
¡
rIJ , p, q, ε
U¢ (s) , w ¡rIJ , p, q, εI¢ (s)ª < 2·(θH+c)·(w2 )αmin{λ,1−λ} < 1δ for all s ∈ S
as desired. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.2: Let {(p1, p2, q) ,J , ωJ } be aME. By definition,
BJ (ωJ , p, q) = w0 − p1 ·X1,J (ω, p, q)− p2 ·X2,J (ωJ , p, q)
Since in equilibrium BJ (ωJ , p, q) = 0 andXi,J (ωJ , p, q) = 1 for all i = 1, 2, it follows that p1 + p2 = w0.
Suppose the ME is symmetric, i.e. J ∈ {∅, {1, 2}}. The case in which J = ∅ follows from proposition 3.1
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since (p1, p2, q) is a DE. So I consider here only the case in which J = {1, 2}.To get a contradiction, suppose
p1 6= p2. Without loss of generality assume p1 < p2. By Proposition 5.1 1− δ ·Eε (w (·)) > 0 for every ε ∈ A.
· Assume first that everybody is informed. Then ωi,J = 0 and rIi,J = rDi for all i = 1, 2. In addition,
Xi,J (0, p, q) = λ · xIi,J (0, p, q, ε) + (1− λ) · xIi,J (0, p, q, ε) = xi
¡
rD, p, q, ε
¢
for every firm i. Since
Eε
³
rDi
pαi
´
= Eε
³
rD−i
pα−i
´
and varε
³
rDi
pαi
´
= varε
³
rD−i
pα−i
´
for every ε ∈ A and xi,J
¡
rD, p, q, ε
¢
> 0 for all i = 1, 2
by E.2, it follows by Lemma 6.1 that X1,J (0, p, q) > X2,J (0, p, q) = 1, a contradiction.
· Assume now there exists some investor εU ∈ A who remains uninformed. The case in which ωi,J = 0 for all
i = 1, 2 is similar to the one in which everybody is informed. So, assume that ωi,J > 0 for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
Then, xUi,J
¡
p, q, εU
¢
> 0. Since EεU
³
rUi
pαi
´
= EεU
³
rU−i
pα−i
´
and varεU
³
rUi
pαi
´
= varεU
³
rU−i
pα−i
´
, then Lemma 6.1
implies that xU1,J
¡
p, q, εU
¢
> xU2,J
¡
p, q, εU
¢
≥ 0. So it cannot be the case that everybody is uninformed. That
is, ωi,J < 1 for some i = 1, 2. Hence, there exists εI ∈ A that is informed. Then ω1,J > ω2,J ≥ 0 implies that
EεI
³
rIi
pαi
´
> EεI
³
rI−i
pα−i
´
and varεI
³
rIi
pαi
´
< varεI
³
rI−i
pα−i
´
. Since ωi,J < 1, Proposition 5.1 implies that no agent
is satiated. Therefore, it must be the case that xI2,J
¡
ωJ , p, q, εI
¢
= 0. Hence, g
¡
εU
¢ · xU2,J ¡p, q, εU¢ = 1. It
follows thatX1,J (ωJ , p, q) = g
¡
εU
¢·xU1,J ¡p, q, εU¢+g ¡εI¢·xI1,J ¡ωJ , p, q, εI¢ > g ¡εU¢·xU2,J ¡p, q, εU¢ =
1, a contradiction. Hence, p1 = p2 = w02 , as desired. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.3: Suppose δ
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
∗¢ > δ and (6) holds. Let p∗ ≡ ¡w02 , w02 ¢ and 0 ≡ (0, 0). I
show that (p∗, q∗) together with J =∅ and ωJ 0 ≡ 0 for all J 0 ∈ P is aME. Clearly, E.1 holds. Since (p∗, q∗)
is aDE, conditions (E.2) and (E.3) hold. Since xJ (ωJ , p∗, q∗, ε) = x
¡
rD, p∗, q∗, ε
¢
= 1,
©
ε : ∆{i}
¡
ω{i}, p∗, q∗, xJ (ωJ , p∗, q∗, ε)
¢
≤ f
ª
=
©
ε : ∆{i} (0, p∗, q∗, 1) ≤ f
ª
= ∅
Since x1,J (0, p∗, q∗, ε) = x2,J (0, p∗, q∗, ε) = 1, it follows that
©
ε : ∆{−i} (0, p∗, q∗, xJ (0, p∗, q∗, ε)) ≤ f
ª
=
©
ε : ∆{i} (0, p∗, q∗, xJ (0, p∗, q∗, ε)) ≤ f
ª
= ∅
Finally, since {i} ⊂ {1, 2} then property (ii) in Lemma 4.2 implies that
©
ε : ∆{1,2} (0, p∗, q∗, xJ (0, p∗, q∗, ε)) ≤ f
ª
=
©
ε : ∆{i} (0, p∗, q∗, xJ (0, p∗, q∗, ε)) ≤ f
ª
= ∅
Therefore, ωJ 0 = 0 satisfies (E.4) for all J 0 ∈ P . Finally, for J 0 = {i}
∆VJ 0J (ωJ , p∗, q∗, ε) = VJ 0 [ωJ 0 , p∗, q∗, xJ (ωJ , p∗, q∗, ε)]− VJ [ωJ , p∗, q∗, xJ (ωJ , p∗, q∗, ε)]
= VJ 0 [0, p∗, q∗, xJ (0, p∗, q∗, ε)]− VJ [0, p∗, q∗, xJ (0, p∗, q∗, ε)] < 0
Hence,
P
ε:∆VJ0J (ωJ ,p∗,q∗,ε)<0
g (ε) · xi,J (0, p∗, q∗, ε) = 1 implies that (E.5) holds. Therefore,©¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
∗¢ ,J , ωJ ª is aME.
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Now suppose {(p1, p2, q) ,J , ωJ } is aME in which J = ∅. Since aME with J = ∅ is a DE, it follows
that (p1, p2, q) = (p∗, q∗). Then, δ
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
∗¢ > δ. Suppose (6) does not hold. Then, ∆{i} (0, p∗, q∗, 1) ≤ f
for all i. Since xJ (p∗, q∗, ε) = (1, 1) for all ε ∈ A and (E.4) holds, it follows that ω{i} 6= (0, 0) for all i. Let ω
be such that ∆{i} (ω, p∗, q∗, 1) = f . On the one hand, since ω{i} satisfies (E.4) and xJ (p∗, q∗, ε) = (1, 1) for
all ε, it must be the case that∆{i}
¡
ω{i}, p∗, q∗, 1
¢
≤ f for all i = 1, 2. It follows by property (i) in Lemma 4.2
that ω{i} ≤ ω < (1, 1) for all i. But on the other hand, ω{i} < (1, 1) together with (E.2) and (E.4) implies that
some investor purchases information. Hence, ∆{i}
¡
ω{i}, p∗, q∗, 1
¢
> f for some i, a contradiction. It follows
that (6) does hold, as desired. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.4: Suppose (R.1),
(R.2) and (R.3) holds. I show that
©¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
¡
εU , εI
¢¢
,J , ωJ
ª
is aME. Clearly (E.1), (E.2) and (E.3)
hold. By symmetry, xU1,J
¡
p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢
= xU2,J
¡
p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢
. Then, ω1,J = ω2,J > 0. By R.3 it
follows that xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢
= xUJ
¡
p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢
. By R.3 and since property (ii) in Lemma
4.2 implies that∆{i} (ω, p, q, x) ≤ ∆J (ω, p, q, x), one obtains that
∆{i}
¡
ω{i}, p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εU
¢¢
≤ ∆J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εU
¢¢
≤ f
∆J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εI
¢¢
≥ ∆{i}
¡
ω{i}, p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εI
¢¢
> f
This implies that
©
ε : ∆J 0
¡
ωJ 0 , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢¢
≤ f
ª
=
©
εU
ª
∀J 0 ∈ P
Then,
ωJ 0 = g
¡
εU
¢·xUJ ¡p∗, q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢ = X
{ε:∆J0(ωJ0 ,p∗,q(εU ,εI),xJ (ωJ ,p∗,q(εU ,εI),ε))≤f}
g (ε)·xUJ
¡
p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, ε
¢
and, therefore, E.4 holds. Notice that
∆V{i}J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢
= V{i}
¡
ω{i}, ·, xJ
¡
ωJ , ·, εU
¢¢
− VJ
¡
ωJ , ·, xJ
¡
ωJ , ·, εU
¢¢
≥ 0
∆V{i}J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εI
¢
= V{i}
¡
ω{i}, ·, xJ
¡
ωJJ , ·, εI
¢¢
− VJ
¡
ωJ , ·, xJ
¡
ωJ , ·, εI
¢¢
< 0
where the strict inequality holds because ωi,{i} = ωi,J > 0 for every i ∈ {1, 2}. Hence,©
ε : ∆VJ 0J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, ε
¢
< 0
ª
=
©
εI
ª
and
X
ε:∆V{i}J (ωJ ,p∗,q(·),xJ (ωJ ,p∗,q(·),ε))<0
g (ε) · xUi,J (p∗, q (·) , ε) = g
¡
εI
¢ · xi,J ¡ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εI¢ = 1− ωJ > 12
Therefore, E.5 holds. It follows that
©¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
¡
εU , εI
¢¢
,J , ωJ
ª
is aME.
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Assume there exists a ME with J = {1, 2}. Then, there is ωJ such that
©¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q
¢
,J , ωJ
ª
satisfies
E.1−E.5. Suppose ωJ = (0, 0). Clearly, E.4 implies that everybody is informed. Hence, for every ε ∈ A
VJJ (0, p, q, xJ (0, p, q, ε)) = E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rI , p, q, xJ (0, p, q, ε)
¢¤¢
− f
= E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rD, p, q, xJ (0, p, q, ε)
¢¤¢
− f
≤ E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIi , r
D
−i, p, q, xJ (0, p, q, ε)
¢ |S1 ¤¢− f
≤ VJ 0J (ωJ 0 , p, q, xJ (0, p, q, ε))
where the first inequality follows because ωJ 0 ≥ ωJ . Hence, ∆V{i}J (ωJ , p∗, q∗, ε) ≥ 0 for all ε,
contradicting condition E.5. It follows that ωJ 6= (0, 0). Hence, there exists some firm i such that ωi,J > 0.
Then, E.4 implies there exists εU such that ∆J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢¢
≤ f . Let
ω ≡ (ω1, ω2) < (1, 1) be the unique solution to ∆J
¡
ω, p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, xJ
¡
ω, p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢¢
= f
such that ω1 = ω2. Since xU1,J
¡
p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢
= xU2,J
¡
p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢
, then ω1,J = ω2,J and
ωi,J ≤ ω < 1. By E.2, there exists εI such that ∆J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εI
¢¢
> f .
Hence, xJ
¡
ωJ , p, q, εI
¢
= xIJ
¡
ωJ , p, q, εI
¢
. Since ωJ ≤ ω < (1, 1), then E.4 implies that ωJ =
g
¡
εU
¢ · xUJ ¡p∗, q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢.
Suppose ω{i} = (0, 0). By properties (ii) and (i) in Lemma 4.2,
∆{i}
¡
0, p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εU
¢¢
≤ ∆J
¡
0, p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εU
¢¢
≤ ∆J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εU
¢¢
≤ f
But then, E.4 implies that xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢
= xUJ
¡
p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, εU
¢
= (0, 0), a contradiction
since ωi,J > 0 for some i. It follows that ω{i} 6= (0, 0) and there exists some firm i such that ωi,{i} > 0.
A reasoning analogous to the one used to prove that ωi,J > 0 ⇒ ωJ = g
¡
εU
¢ · xUJ ¡p∗, q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢
can be used here to show that ωi,{i} > 0 ⇒ ω{i} = g
¡
εU
¢ · xUJ ¡p∗, q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢. By symmetry,
g
¡
εU
¢ · xU1,J ¡p∗, q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢ = g ¡εU¢ · xU2,J ¡p∗, q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢. Hence, ωj,{i} > 0 for all j. Since
ωJ = ω{i} = g
¡
εU
¢ · xUJ ¡p∗, q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢, then it must be the case that
∆J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εU
¢¢
≤ f < ∆{i}
¡
ω{i}, p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εI
¢¢
and, therefore, R.3 holds. Therefore,
©
ε : ∆V{i}J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, ε
¢
< 0
ª
=
©
εI
ª
and by E.5, it follows
that
ωJ = g
¡
εU
¢ ·xUJ ¡p∗, q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢ = 1− X
ε:∆V{i}J (ωJ ,p∗,q(εU ,εI),ε)<0
g (ε) ·xi,J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, ε
¢
<
1
2
for all i. Thus, condition R.2 holds, as desired. ¥
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Proof of Lemma 5.1: Suppose {(p1, p2, q) ,J , ωJ } is a ME with J = {1, 2}. By Proposition 5.2,
p1 = p2 =
w0
2 . From the no arbitrage conditions,
pi
q
= EεU
Ã
1− δ · wUJ
1− δ ·EεU
¡
wUJ
¢ · rUi
!
= EεI
Ã
1− δ · wIJ
1− δ ·EεI
¡
wIJ
¢ · rIi
!
and, after some algebra, one obtains that
EεU
¡
rUi
¢
− δ·x
U
i,J
1−δ·EεU (wUJ )
·£varεU ¡rUi ¢+ covεU ¡rUi , rUj ¢¤ = EεI ¡rIi ¢− δ·xIi,J1−δ·EεI (wIJ ) ·£var ¡rIi ¢+ covεI ¡rIi , rIj ¢¤
where I use the property that xk1,J = xk2,J for any k ∈ {I, U}. By Proposition 5.1, 1 −
δ · EεU
¡
wkJ
¢
> 0 for all k ∈ {I, U}. Since EεU
¡
rUi
¢
<
¡
θ + c
¢ · pαi ≤ EεI ¡rIi ¢ and
varεU
¡
rUi
¢
+ covεU
³
rUi , r
U
j
´
> σ2 · p2·αi ≥ varεI
¡
rIi
¢
+ covεI
³
rIi , r
I
j
´
, then
δ · xUi,J
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q, ε
U
¢
1− δ ·EεU
¡
wUJ
¢ < δ · xIi,J ¡ωJ , w02 , w02 , q, εI¢
1− δ ·EεI
¡
wIJ
¢ (21)
Since MRS [Eε (w) , varε (w)] = δ1−δ·Eε(w) , I shall show that
δ
1−δ·EεU (wUJ )
< δ
1−δ·EεI (wIJ )
. Suppose not.
Then,
EεU
¡
wUJ
¢
≥ EεI
¡
wIJ
¢
⇔ 2 ·EεU
µ
rU1 −
w0/2
q
¶
· xU1,J
¡·, εU¢ ≥ 2 ·EεI µrI1 − w0/2q
¶
· xI1,J
¡·, εI¢
⇒ xU1,J
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q, ε
U¢ > xI1,J ¡ωJ , w02 , w02 , q, εI¢
But this implies
δ · xU1,J
¡w0
2 ,
w0
2 , q, ε
U
¢
1− δ ·EεU
¡
wUJ
¢ ≥ δ · xI1,J ¡ωJ , w02 , w02 , q, εI¢
1− δ ·EεI
¡
wIJ
¢
which contradicts (21). Therefore,MRS
£
EεU
¡
wUJ
¢
, varεU
¡
wUJ
¢¤
< MRS
£
EεI
¡
wIJ
¢
, varεI
¡
wIJ
¢¤
. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.5: Suppose {(p1, p2, q) ,J , ωJ } is aME with J = {i}. Suppose ωi,J = 0. Then,
∆V∅J (ωJ , p, q, ε) = V∅ (ω∅, p, q, xJ (ωJJ , p, q, ε))− VJ (ωJ , p, q, xJ (ωJ , p, q, ε))
= E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rD, p, q, xJ (ωJ , p, q, ε)
¢¤ |S1 ¢− VJ (ωJ , p, q, xJ (ωJ , p, q, ε)) > 0
where the last inequality uses the fact that for any x ∈ <2+,
max
©
E
¡
u
£
w
¡
rIJ , p, q, x
¢¤ |S1 ¢− f,E ¡u £w ¡rUJ , p, q, x¢¤ |S1 ¢ª¯¯ωi,J=0 < E ¡u £w ¡rD, p, q, x¢¤ |S1 ¢
But ∆V∅J (ωJ , p, q, ε) > 0 for all ε, contradicts condition E.5. Hence, ωi,J 6= 0 and there exists
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εU ∈ A such that ∆J
¡
ωJ , p, q, xJ
¡
ωJ , p, q, εU
¢¢
≤ f . Then, xJ
¡
ωJ , p, q, εU
¢
= xUJ
¡
p, q, εU
¢
and
xUi,J
¡
p, q, εU
¢
> 0. Let ω be a solution to ∆J
¡
ω, p, q, xJ
¡
ω, p, q, εU
¢¢
= f . Clearly, 0 < ωi,J ≤ ωi < 1.
Then, there also exists εI ∈ A such that ∆J
¡
ωJ , p, q, xJ
¡
ωJ , p, q, εI
¢¢
> f . By (E.2) and (E.4),
ωi,J = g
¡
εU
¢ · xUi,J ¡p, q, εU¢ ∈ (0, 1) and ωj,J = g ¡εU¢ · xUj,J ¡p, q, εU¢.
Suppose ωJ 0 > g
¡
εU
¢ · xUj,J ¡p, q, εU¢ for J 0 = {1, 2}. Then, εI will not acquire information. But
∆J 0
¡
ωJ 0 , p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εI
¢¢
> ∆J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , xJ
¡
ωJ , p∗, q (·) , εI
¢¢
> f
a contradiction. It follows that ωJ 0 ≤ g
¡
εU
¢ · xUj,J ¡p, q, εU¢. Hence, A.1 holds.
To show that ωj,J ∈ (0, 1), suppose there exists some ε such that xj,J (ωJ , p, q, ε) = 0. Since
xi,J (ωJ , p, q, ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ A, it follows that for some k ∈ {I, U}
Eε
µ
rkj −
pj
q
¶
− δ ·Eε
∙µ
rki −
pi
q
¶
·
µ
rkj −
pj
q
¶
· xi + wq
µ
rkj −
pj
q
¶¸
≤ 0
⇔ Eε
µ
rkj −
pj
q
¶
− δ ·Eε
µ
rkj −
pj
q
¶
Eε
∙µ
rki −
pi
q
¶
· ·xi + wq
¸
≤ 0
⇔ δ ·Eε
∙µ
rki −
pi
q
¶
· xi + wq
¸
≥ 1
The last inequality implies that there exists some state s ∈ S such thatw
¡
rkJ , p, q, ε
¢
(s) ≥ 1δ which contradicts
Proposition 5.1 since I argued that ωi,J < 1. It follows that xj,J (ωJ , p, q, ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ A. Therefore,
ωj,J ∈ (0, 1), as desired. Hence, A.2 holds.
Clearly,
©
ε : ∆V∅J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, ε
¢
< 0
ª
=
©
εI
ª
and by E.5 it follows that A.3 holds because
ωi,J = g
¡
εU
¢·xUi,J ¡p∗, q ¡εU , εI¢ , εU¢ = 1− X
ε:∆V∅ J (ωJ ,p∗,q(εU ,εI),ε)<0
g (ε)·xi,J
¡
ωJ , p∗, q
¡
εU , εI
¢
, ε
¢
<
1
2
¥
Proof of Lemma 5.2: Suppose {(p1, p2, q) ,J , ωJ } is a ME with J = {i}. By Proposition
5.1, 1 − δ · EεU
¡
wUJ
¢
> 0 and 1 − δ · EεI
¡
wIJ
¢
> 0. In order to get a contradiction, assume
MRS
£
EεU
¡
wUJ
¢
, varεU
¡
wUJ
¢¤
≥MRS
£
EεI
¡
wIJ
¢
, varεI
¡
wIJ
¢¤
. Then EεU
¡
wUJ
¢
≥ EεI
¡
wIJ
¢
. It follows
that
E

rDj −
pj
q

xUj,J (p,q,εU)·var(rDj )
≥
E

rDj −
pj
q

xIj,J (ωJ ,p,q,εI)·var(rDj )
⇔ xUj,J
¡
p, q, εU
¢
≤ xIj,J
¡
ωJ , p, q, εI
¢
EεU

rUi −
pi
q

xUi,J (p,q,εU )·varεU (rUi ) ≥
EεI

rIi−
pi
q

xIi,J (ωJ ,p,q,εI)·varεI (rIi ) ⇒ x
U
i,J
¡
p, q, εU
¢
≤ xIi,J
¡
ωJ , p, q, εI
¢
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But then,
EεU
¡
wUJ
¢
< EεU
h
xUi,J
¡·, εU¢ · ³¡θ + c¢ · pαi − piq ´+ xUj,J ¡·, εU¢ · ³rDj − pjq ´i
= EεI
h
xUi,J
¡·, εU¢ · ³¡θ + c¢ · pαi − piq ´+ xUj,J ¡·, εU¢ · ³rDj − pjq ´i
≤ EεI
h
xIi,J
¡·, εI¢ · ³rIi − piq ´+ xIj,J ¡·, εI¢ · ³rDj − pjq ´i = EεI ¡wIJ ¢
a contradiction. It follows thatMRS
£
EεU
¡
wUJ
¢
, varεU
¡
wUJ
¢¤
< MRS
£
EεI
¡
wIJ
¢
, varεI
¡
wIJ
¢¤
. Suppose
pi ≥ pj . Then by the no arbitrage conditions
1−ωj,J
1−ωi,J ·
ωi,J
ωj,J =
EεU

rUi
pαi
− p
1−α
i
q

EεI

rIi
pαi
−p
1−α
i
q
 ·
varεI

rIi
pαi

varεU

rUi
pαi
 < σ
2
varεU

rUi
pαi

Since EεU
³
rUi
pαi
´
< E
³
rDj
pαj
´
and varεU
³
rUi
pαi
´
> σ2, it follows that ωi,J < ωj,J , as desired. ¥
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